HIGH Introduced in 4.8
vsock ConnectedSocket Injection
CVE-2026-99123
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
KernelScan AI7.1HIGH
01Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: validate packet source for connected sockets virtio_transport_recv_pkt() looks up sockets first by the full source and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The fallback is needed for listening and connecting sockets, but sockets remain in the bound table after connect(), so it can also return a non-listening socket. The fallback does not validate the source address. In TCP_SYN_SENT, a RESPONSE from an unrelated source can transition the victim socket to TCP_ESTABLISHED while its stored remote address remains unchanged. Subsequent RW packets from that source are delivered through the same destination-only fallback. This was reproduced with capability-empty processes under different UIDs. The attacker discovered the target tuple through unprivileged AF_VSOCK sock_diag and caused the victim socket to read 16 attacker-chosen bytes; the intended peer-side socket read 0 of those 16 bytes. Add vsock_check_source() to validate the transport, source port and source CID against the peer stored in a non-listening socket. The local transport is the CID exception because its packets are generated internally with VMADDR_CID_LOCAL as their source, including connections using CID aliases. Use the helper after lock_sock() in the virtio receive path.
02KernelScan AI Analysis
Risk summary
A local unprivileged process can inject arbitrary data into another process's vsock connection and forcibly terminate it. The attacker only needs access to AF_VSOCK sockets and the ability to enumerate connection tuples via sock_diag, both available to ordinary users. This affects any system using virtio-vsock for VM-to-host or inter-VM communication, including containerized and multi-tenant environments.
Vulnerability analysis
The virtio vsock transport looks up receiving sockets first by full source/destination tuple, then falls back to a destination-only table. Connected sockets remain in that fallback table, but the fallback path did not verify that the packet's source address matched the socket's stored peer. An attacker who learns a victim's socket tuple (via unprivileged sock_diag) can send a spoofed RESPONSE packet that moves a connecting socket to ESTABLISHED, then stream arbitrary RW packets that the kernel delivers to the victim's receive queue. The victim application reads the attacker's payload while the legitimate peer sees nothing. The same flaw also allows forged RST or SHUTDOWN packets to tear down the connection repeatedly, denying service. The fix adds a source-validation helper that checks transport, port, and CID (with a local-CID exception for loopback) before accepting a packet for a non-listening socket.
Lifecycle
03Fix Versions
| Branch | Introduced | Fixed in | Patch commit |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.15 | 4.8 | 5.15.224 | bda841af86cd |
| 6.1 | 4.8 | 6.1.191 | c0a3a786a5e8 |
| 6.12 | 4.8 | 6.12.115 | ec231dd3b14e |
| 6.18 | 4.8 | 6.18.59 | 6cd829de69ef |
| 6.6 | 4.8 | 6.6.161 | f77fb90edca5 |
| 7.2 | 4.8 | 7.2.13 | e9bf92de436b |
| mainline | 4.8 | 7.3 | dee44f41f206 |
| cip/6.12 | 4.8 | 6.12.117-cip35 | ec231dd3b14e |
04CIP Kernels
State of the newest release of each Civil Infrastructure Platform SLTS tree, from CIP's own fix records.
| CIP tree | State |
|---|---|
| cip/6.12 | Fixed in 6.12.117-cip35 |
| cip/6.1 | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 6.1.190-cip62) |
| cip/6.1-rt | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 6.1.189-cip61-rt32) |
| cip/5.10 | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 5.10.272-cip79) |
| cip/5.10-rt | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 5.10.272-cip79-rt35) |
| cip/4.19 | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 4.19.325-cip137) |
| cip/4.19-rt | Affected — no CIP fix yet (latest 4.19.325-cip137-rt51) |