HIGH Introduced in 6.19
cgroup DyingTask UAF
CVE-2026-98163
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
01Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)
02KernelScan AI Analysis
Risk summary
Any local user can trigger a use-after-free in the cgroup task iterator by reading cgroup.procs while thread group leaders are exiting. The race window is narrow but requires no privileges, making this exploitable from unprivileged contexts including containers. Successful exploitation could lead to kernel memory corruption, information disclosure, or a system crash.
Vulnerability analysis
A race condition in the cgroup task iterator can return a task object that has already been released. While the iterator walks the list of exiting tasks, the lock is dropped between steps, allowing a thread group leader to finish exiting and have its last reference drop away. When the iterator continues, it incorrectly tries to acquire a new reference on this already-released task, returning a stale pointer to the caller. This leads to use-after-free when the caller later accesses the task. The fix changes the iterator to skip any task whose reference count has already reached zero, preventing the iterator from returning a freed object. Any local user can trigger this by reading a cgroup.procs file while threads are exiting; no special privileges or hardware are needed.
Lifecycle
03Fix Versions
| Branch | Introduced | Fixed in | Patch commit |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.2 | 6.19 | 7.2.8 | 828938118d6c |
| mainline | 6.19 | 7.3-rc4 | 057dac23d329 |