KernelScan.io

HIGH Introduced in 4.7

rds ResetCallbacks Race

CVE-2026-98070

CVSS 8.1 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

KernelScan AI8.1HIGH

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset(). Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent. Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock. Two details of the old code go away with the same change: - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown() releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths remain as exposed to each other as they are today. - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down meanwhile and is dropped. The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them.

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A race condition in the RDS-TCP connection reset path allows the transmit path to run concurrently with socket swapping and state reset, corrupting internal connection state or dereferencing a freed socket. Any network peer that can establish RDS-TCP connections to the target can trigger this during normal duelling-SYN resolution without special privileges. The result is kernel memory corruption leading to potential code execution or a system crash.

Affectednet/rds/tcp.c (RDS-TCP transport)

Vulnerability analysis

The RDS-TCP connection reset function waits for a transmit-lock bit to become clear but does not atomically acquire it, so the transmit path can immediately re-acquire the lock and run concurrently with the socket swap and internal state reset that the reset function performs. On weakly ordered architectures a store-buffering pattern between the two paths lets each side miss the other's write, widening the race window. Separately, the old socket pointer is cached before the wait completes and can become stale if the connection is torn down during the wait, leading to use of a freed socket. The fix replaces the wait-and-sample pattern with an atomic test-and-set acquisition of the transmit lock, holds that lock across the socket swap and state reset, reads the old socket pointer only after the lock is owned, and releases the lock with a wake-up at the end. The vulnerable path is reached over the network during RDS-TCP duelling-SYN resolution — a normal protocol event — and requires no special privileges when the RDS module is loaded.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
5.104.75.10.271670af4e4a4de
5.154.75.15.222830a2e21b200
6.14.76.1.189a05790cb4ff0
6.64.76.6.158d184e6dd4b8f
6.124.76.12.111d625112564c3
6.184.76.18.538e4c3b7844c9
7.24.77.2.7062d9e008c67
mainline4.77.3-rc202c5f9dc2efd
cip/6.124.76.12.111-cip32d625112564c3