KernelScan.io

HIGH Introduced in 5.12

acrn Irqfd UAF

CVE-2026-97478

CVSS 7.8 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

KernelScan AI6.0MEDIUM

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virt: acrn: Fix irqfd use-after-free during eventfd shutdown acrn_irqfd_deassign() and the eventfd EPOLLHUP wakeup can race and free the same struct hsm_irqfd: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- eventfd_release() wake_up_poll(EPOLLHUP) hsm_irqfd_wakeup() queue_work(&irqfd->shutdown) acrn_irqfd_deassign() hsm_irqfd_shutdown() list_del_init() eventfd_ctx_remove_wait_queue() eventfd_ctx_put() kfree(irqfd) hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work() container_of(work, ..., shutdown) irqfd->vm <-- use-after-free The deassign path freed the irqfd while a shutdown work item was already queued by EPOLLHUP (or vice versa), so the work item could resurrect a dangling pointer through container_of(). Switch to the lifetime model used by KVM irqfds: - Deassign/deinit only deactivate the irqfd: remove it from vm->irqfds under irqfds_lock and queue the cleanup work. - hsm_irqfd_shutdown_work() becomes the sole owner that unhooks the eventfd waitqueue entry, drops the eventfd reference and frees the irqfd. - A new HSM_IRQFD_FLAG_SHUTDOWN bit guarded by test_and_set_bit() ensures the cleanup work is queued at most once, no matter how many of {EPOLLHUP, deassign, deinit} fire concurrently. This is safe to call from the waitqueue callback, which runs with wqh->lock held and IRQs disabled and therefore cannot take irqfds_lock. - acrn_irqfd_deassign() flushes vm->irqfd_wq before returning so the eventfd is fully detached on return. acrn_irqfd_deinit() deactivates every irqfd, flushes the workqueue and only then destroys it, so no path can queue_work() onto a torn-down workqueue. - acrn_irqfd_assign() now installs the eventfd waitqueue entry and publishes the irqfd to vm->irqfds under irqfds_lock, so the irqfd is never visible to deassign/deinit before its waitqueue entry is in place, and any EPOLLHUP that fires in the assign window queues cleanup work that blocks on irqfds_lock until publication is done.

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A race condition in the ACRN hypervisor driver's interrupt-fd mechanism allows a use-after-free when an eventfd is closed concurrently with an irqfd deassign operation. An attacker with root access to a system running the ACRN hypervisor could exploit this to corrupt kernel memory, potentially achieving code execution or causing a kernel panic.

Affecteddrivers/virt/acrn/irqfd.c (virt:acrn)

Vulnerability analysis

The ACRN hypervisor driver's interrupt-fd mechanism can free an internal object from one teardown path while a concurrent path still expects to use it. Closing an event descriptor can race with a manual removal request, so a pending cleanup task may run after the object has already been freed, causing the kernel to access released memory. The fix funnels all cleanup through a single background task that is guaranteed to run only once no matter how many events arrive, and ensures that task completes before the related resources are destroyed. A local attacker with access to the hypervisor management device can trigger this race; on typical systems that requires root privileges, and the target must be running the ACRN hypervisor.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
6.185.126.18.53d8156aacfcab
mainline5.127.2666c7f9e0792