CRITICAL Introduced in 5.11
svcrdma ReadChunk Underflow
CVE-2026-89533
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
KernelScan AI9.8CRITICAL
01Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Fix offset arithmetic in read_chunk_range svc_rdma_read_chunk_range() walks a Read chunk's segment list to build a sub-range starting at byte offset and spanning length bytes for a Position-Zero or Call chunk. Two arithmetic defects in the per-segment loop produce wrong DMA lengths and a u32 underflow: pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk) { if (offset > segment->rs_length) { offset -= segment->rs_length; continue; } dummy.rs_handle = segment->rs_handle; dummy.rs_length = min_t(u32, length, segment->rs_length) - offset; dummy.rs_offset = segment->rs_offset + offset; First, the skip predicate uses '>' instead of '>='. When offset equals the segment's full rs_length, the segment is fully consumed and should be skipped, but the loop falls through into the body. The resulting dummy.rs_length is min_t(u32, length, rs_length) - rs_length, which underflows to a near-UINT_MAX u32 when length is smaller than rs_length, or is zero otherwise. Second, the length formula subtracts offset from the min_t() result rather than from segment->rs_length before the cap. For offset > 0 the segment's residual is rs_length - offset, not rs_length, so the cap must be applied to the residual. With the current bracketing, whenever length is smaller than rs_length - offset the per-segment length becomes length - offset instead of length, silently dropping offset bytes from the rebuilt chunk. Combined with the boundary case above it also enables the u32 underflow path, which propagates a huge nr_bvec into svc_rdma_build_read_segment() and a multi-MiB kmalloc_array_node() in svc_rdma_get_rw_ctxt(). Additionally, svc_rdma_read_call_chunk() can invoke this function with length == 0 when the last Read chunk ends exactly at the end of the Call chunk. With the corrected >= predicate, every segment is skipped and the function returns the initial -EINVAL, rejecting a valid request. Return success immediately when length is zero. Also break out of the loop once length is fully consumed to avoid passing zero-length segments to svc_rdma_build_read_segment(). Fix by using '>=' so a fully-consumed segment is skipped, by moving '- offset' inside min_t() so the cap is applied to the segment's residual length, by returning success for zero-length requests, and by stopping iteration when the requested range has been consumed.
02KernelScan AI Analysis
Risk summary
A remote attacker can send a crafted RPC-over-RDMA request to an NFS/RDMA server to trigger an integer underflow in Read chunk segment processing, producing a near-maximum length value that causes a multi-megabyte memory allocation and potential memory corruption. The vulnerable path is in the transport layer and requires no authentication or special privileges, only network access to the server's RDMA port. Systems running NFS/RDMA servers on kernels from 5.11 onward are affected.
Vulnerability analysis
A remote NFS/RDMA client can trigger an integer underflow in the server's Read chunk processing by sending a crafted request where the byte offset exactly matches a segment's length boundary. The underflow produces a near-maximum unsigned 32-bit value that propagates as a DMA transfer length and allocation size, causing a multi-megabyte memory allocation and potential memory corruption during DMA setup. The fix corrects the boundary check so fully-consumed segments are skipped, reorders the arithmetic so the length cap is applied to the segment's residual rather than the full segment length, returns success for zero-length requests, and stops iteration once the requested range is fully consumed. The vulnerable path is reachable by any network client that can send an RPC-over-RDMA message to the server, with no authentication or special privileges required.
Lifecycle
03Fix Versions
| Branch | Introduced | Fixed in | Patch commit |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.15 | 5.11 | 5.15.221 | 10873311f91d |
| 6.1 | 5.11 | 6.1.188 | addbf02dfe3b |
| 6.12 | 5.11 | 6.12.109 | 6ee4dc7476b3 |
| 6.18 | 5.11 | 6.18.50 | a46b35f213c2 |
| 6.6 | 5.11 | 6.6.157 | cba8543c18cf |
| 7.2 | 5.11 | 7.2.4 | 4493c96bbd00 |
| mainline | 5.11 | 7.3 | 4a44c140cc2f |
| cip/6.1 | 5.11 | 6.1.189-cip61 | addbf02dfe3b |
| cip/6.1-rt | 5.11 | 6.1.189-cip61-rt32 | addbf02dfe3b |
| cip/6.12 | 5.11 | 6.12.111-cip32 | 6ee4dc7476b3 |
04CIP Kernels
State of the newest release of each Civil Infrastructure Platform SLTS tree, from CIP's own fix records.
| CIP tree | State |
|---|---|
| cip/6.12 | Fixed in 6.12.111-cip32 |
| cip/6.1 | Fixed in 6.1.189-cip61 |
| cip/6.1-rt | Fixed in 6.1.189-cip61-rt32 |