KernelScan.io

HIGH Introduced in 4.4

rtl8xxxu RxUrb UAF

CVE-2026-80947

CVSS 7.8 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

KernelScan AI6.3MEDIUM

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix use-after-free from rx_urb_wq on stop rtl8xxxu arms rx_urb_wq from the RX completion path: rtl8xxxu_rx_complete() hands the URB to rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(), which queues it on rx_urb_pending_list and, once the list grows past RTL8XXXU_RX_URB_PENDING_WATER, schedules rx_urb_wq. The worker rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() drains rx_urb_pending_list, recovers priv through container_of, and resubmits each URB through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(), which anchors it on rx_anchor and dereferences priv->udev. rtl8xxxu_stop() cancels the sibling work items (c2hcmd_work, ra_watchdog, update_beacon_work) but never cancels rx_urb_wq, so a worker armed during the last burst of RX traffic can run rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() after rtl8xxxu_disconnect() has called ieee80211_free_hw(), which frees priv, producing a use-after-free. The window opens under active RX traffic (pending count above the watermark) followed by a disconnect. There are two teardown races to close: * rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb() decided whether to enqueue under rx_urb_lock but called schedule_work() after dropping the lock. A completion that observed shutdown == false and released the lock could then call schedule_work() after rtl8xxxu_stop() had set shutdown and cancel_work_sync() had already returned, arming the worker to run after the teardown. Move schedule_work() under the same !shutdown branch so the arming decision is atomic with the shutdown check. * rtl8xxxu_rx_urb_work() anchors every URB it drained back onto rx_anchor through rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(). A worker still running when usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_anchor) returned would submit a URB that escaped the kill. In rtl8xxxu_stop(), call cancel_work_sync(&priv->rx_urb_wq) before the kill so the worker is drained first. After priv->shutdown is set under rx_urb_lock, completions can no longer queue rx_urb_wq. cancel_work_sync() then drains the last queued or running worker, and the following usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the URBs it may have submitted. rtl8xxxu_disconnect() is covered because ieee80211_unregister_hw() guarantees .stop() runs for a live interface before ieee80211_free_hw() frees priv. The probe error path needs no cancel: rx_urb_wq is INIT_WORK()'d there but cannot have been scheduled, since no URB is submitted before ieee80211_register_hw() succeeds. This bug was found by static analysis.

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A use-after-free in the rtl8xxxu USB WiFi driver occurs when a deferred RX work item runs after the driver's private data has been freed during teardown. The race requires active WiFi reception timed with a device disconnect, reachable by a local privileged user or physical USB unplug. Successful exploitation can corrupt kernel heap memory, potentially leading to code execution or a kernel crash.

Affecteddrivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c (rtl8xxxu WiFi driver)

Vulnerability analysis

The rtl8xxxu USB WiFi driver schedules a deferred work item to resubmit received USB request buffers when the pending queue grows beyond a threshold. During interface teardown, the driver sets a shutdown flag and cancels several other work items but never cancels this RX work item, and the decision to schedule the work is made outside the lock that guards the shutdown flag. Together these gaps allow a worker armed during the final burst of incoming WiFi traffic to run after the driver has already freed its private data structure, producing a use-after-free. The fix moves the work-scheduling decision under the same lock as the shutdown check so the two are atomic, and adds an explicit cancel of the RX work item before killing anchored URBs during stop. The vulnerability is reachable on any system with a Realtek rtl8xxxu USB WiFi adapter that is actively receiving traffic; triggering it requires either physical access to unplug the device or local privileges sufficient to bring the interface down or unbind the driver, timed to coincide with active reception.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
6.184.46.18.50620acb1e8037
mainline4.47.3-rc16c080026ecc1
6.124.46.12.109800d2b490a9a
7.24.47.2.4972ab8b9c08f
cip/6.124.46.12.111-cip32800d2b490a9a