KernelScan.io

CRITICAL Introduced in 4.14

seg6 IPIPDecap OOB

CVE-2026-80840

CVSS 9.8 / 10.0 KernelScan AI

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB before IPv4 interprets skb->cb. The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and ts. The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to 40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees optlen = 40 and rr = 40. Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte option-data area. Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel both produced: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255 The relevant End.DX4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dx4_finish input_action_end_dx4 The relevant End.DT4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dt4 tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so it does not appear as a separate frame. When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and End.DT46's IPv4 arm. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master; IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted IPv6 Segment Routing packet to a target with seg6local End.DX4 or End.DT4 actions configured, causing a heap out-of-bounds write of up to 255 bytes in the kernel's IPv4 option-echo path. The target must also have a TCP listener reachable by the decapsulated inner IPv4 packet. This can lead to kernel crash or potential code execution.

Affectednet/ipv6/seg6_local.c (ipv6 seg6 local actions)

Vulnerability analysis

When an IPv6 Segment Routing node decapsulates an IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel packet via the End.DX4 or End.DT4 local action, the per-packet control block is not cleared before the inner IPv4 packet enters IPv4 routing. The IPv6 control block data left in the shared control-block storage is then misinterpreted by the IPv4 stack as IP option metadata. A sender can craft the outer IPv6 packet's extension headers so that a stale field is read as a nonzero IP option length, causing the TCP SYN handling path to allocate a small option buffer and then copy a sender-controlled number of bytes (up to 255) into it — a heap out-of-bounds write. The fix clears the IPv4 control block during decapsulation, preserving only the ingress interface, so the IPv4 stack sees a clean control block as it would from a normally received packet. The vulnerability is reachable from the network by an unauthenticated attacker sending IPv6 packets to a target that has seg6local decapsulation actions configured and a TCP listener for the inner IPv4 packet.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
5.104.145.10.26910fd1a8f58ac
5.154.145.15.220eb0f42248722
6.14.146.1.1879039e4f3e1c0
6.124.146.12.1080e3f01fe2e70
6.184.146.18.493e4476e58343
6.64.146.6.156f52f1e75716d
7.14.147.1.13bf1c1151560d
7.24.147.2.3f4be3b391265
mainline4.147.3-rc144930446dde4