KernelScan.io

CRITICAL Introduced in 5.19

net gro BigTcp OOB Write

CVE-2026-80725

CVSS 9.8 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

KernelScan AI8.8HIGH

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB), BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP (with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header). However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp") loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues: 1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head, causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header. 2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q / ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true. 3. It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark, allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate beyond 64KB. Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce: - NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP - Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation) - Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6 - If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr) Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without dropping. This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like 6.18.y.

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A local or adjacent attacker can inject crafted network frames via AF_PACKET that bypass insufficient BIG TCP validation in the GRO receive path, triggering an out-of-bounds write when the IPv6 hop-by-hop jumbo header is inserted. This can corrupt kernel memory, leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or system crash. The issue affects stable branches 6.1 through 6.18 and is already fixed in mainline 7.0+.

Affectednet/core/gro.c (networking GRO subsystem)

Vulnerability analysis

The GRO aggregation path fails to properly validate BIG TCP criteria, allowing crafted frames with insufficient MAC header room to pass the headroom check. When the IPv6 completion handler inserts a temporary hop-by-hop jumbo header, the memmove operation writes before the start of the packet buffer, causing an out-of-bounds memory write and corrupting the MAC header offset. The fix removes the HBH insertion logic entirely on the receive side and tightens the aggregation check to reject oversized non-plain-IP or encapsulated packets. The vulnerable path is reachable from a local process via AF_PACKET injection or from an adjacent network position sending packets that trigger GRO aggregation.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
6.125.196.12.10603cb8cc2961f
mainline5.197.081be30c1f5f2
6.15.196.1.18537a5dcd6837f
6.185.196.18.473ce832e2bd43
6.65.196.6.154e907bf694ed5