KernelScan.io

HIGH Introduced in 6.2

cxl HeaderLog OOB Read

CVE-2026-80662

CVSS 7.1 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

KernelScan AI5.5MEDIUM

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size The CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58 bytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing 64 bytes at offset 0x18. CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512, eight times the actual on-device size. header_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the RAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes. The cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE (512) bytes from its source. For the CPER caller the source is struct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a stack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes of kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can read it via tracefs. Set CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it, bringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords. Userspace tools such as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32) header_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event. Add CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event __array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI. Both callers now pass a zero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only the first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware; the remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring buffer layout intact. [ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ]

02

Engine v0.6.0

Risk summary

A size constant for the CXL RAS header log was defined eight times larger than the actual hardware register block, causing the error-handling path to read past the end of an MMIO mapping and copy adjacent kernel stack into a tracefs ring buffer readable by userspace. Any local user with access to tracefs can recover leaked kernel memory when a CXL device reports an uncorrectable error. The fix corrects the constant to 64 bytes while preserving the existing 512-byte trace-event ABI by zero-padding a staging buffer.

Affecteddrivers/cxl/core/ras.c (CXL RAS)

Vulnerability analysis

The CXL error-handling code used a wrong size constant for reading hardware RAS status, making it fetch 512 bytes from a register block that only holds 88 bytes. When processing an uncorrectable error from a CXL device, the extra bytes came from whatever lay beyond the MMIO window. In one code path, a stack buffer was also copied with the same oversize, so 448 bytes of kernel stack were placed into a trace event that userspace can read through tracefs. The fix reduces the hardware read to the correct 64 bytes and uses a separate, larger staging buffer for the trace ABI so no out-of-bounds data is touched. The bug fires whenever a CXL device reports an uncorrectable error; users with local access to tracefs can then retrieve the leaked bytes.

03

BranchIntroducedFixed inPatch commit
6.186.26.18.426fc1919a6f2e
7.16.27.1.5fc5eb0962a5e
mainline6.27.2c268f949e219