KernelScan.io

HIGH

eventpoll FilePin UAF

CVE-2026-46242

CVSS 7.8 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

KernelScan AI6.9MEDIUM

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

02

Engine v0.2.0

Risk summary

Local attackers with low privileges can exploit a use-after-free vulnerability in the epoll subsystem to achieve arbitrary kernel memory corruption. The bug is a race condition between ep_remove() and __fput() that allows writing to freed memory during concurrent file descriptor operations, potentially leading to privilege escalation or system compromise.

Affectedfs/eventpoll.c (epoll subsystem)

Vulnerability analysis

The vulnerability stems from a race condition in ep_remove() where file->f_ep is cleared under f_lock but the file pointer continues to be used afterward. A concurrent __fput() can observe the transient NULL f_ep, skip cleanup, and free the underlying eventpoll structure while ep_remove() is still accessing it via hlist_del_rcu(). This creates two UAF scenarios: writing to freed kmalloc memory through the freed eventpoll's embedded hlist_head, and potential slab confusion due to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU recycling of the file structure. The fix pins the file reference via epi_fget() before the critical section, ensuring the file and transitively the eventpoll structure remain alive during the operation.

03

BranchFixed inPatch commit
5.165.16ef4ca02e9536
6.186.18.33a6dc643c6931
6.26.2ced39b6a8062
7.07.0.10
mainline7.1-rc1