KernelScan.io

HIGH

drm/exynos VIDI Deref

CVE-2026-45958

CVSS 7.1 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

KernelScan AI6.9MEDIUM

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/exynos: vidi: fix to avoid directly dereferencing user pointer In vidi_connection_ioctl(), vidi->edid(user pointer) is directly dereferenced in the kernel. This allows arbitrary kernel memory access from the user space, so instead of directly accessing the user pointer in the kernel, we should modify it to copy edid to kernel memory using copy_from_user() and use it.

02

Engine v0.2.0

Risk summary

Local attackers with access to DRM graphics devices can achieve arbitrary kernel memory reads by passing attacker-controlled pointers through the VIDI connection ioctl. This can lead to information disclosure of sensitive kernel memory or trigger a kernel oops/panic on systems using Exynos graphics hardware.

Affecteddrivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c (DRM Exynos)

Vulnerability analysis

The vulnerability occurs in vidi_connection_ioctl() where the user-supplied EDID pointer is directly dereferenced in kernel space. The original code cast the user pointer to a kernel address and read from it (including reading the extensions field to calculate size), allowing an unprivileged caller to pass arbitrary kernel addresses and read their contents. The fix replaces the direct dereference with copy_from_user(), safely copying the EDID data into a kernel-allocated buffer before processing.

03

BranchFixed inPatch commit
5.105.10.25313537f7f6d28
5.155.15.203c2914c0ca755
6.16.1.1677efb6a4e6b1b
6.126.12.774c4193829109
6.186.18.144949e32387fe
6.196.19.4235d702b7714
6.66.6.1302e147aa3169b
mainline7.0d4c98c077c7f