HIGH
writeback WorkQueue UAF
CVE-2026-31703
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
KernelScan AI7.8HIGH
01Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like: wb_get(new_wb); while (1) { list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs); /* Nothing to do? */ if (!list) break; ... process the items ... } Now adding of items to the list looks like: wb_queue_isw() if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs)) queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work); Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing use-after-free issues. We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead. That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work runs.
02KernelScan AI Analysis
Risk summary
A local attacker or buggy application could trigger filesystem operations that cause use-after-free conditions in the kernel's writeback subsystem, potentially leading to system crashes, memory corruption, or privilege escalation. The vulnerability affects systems with active cgroup usage and filesystem writeback operations.
Vulnerability analysis
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in writeback subsystem's inode switching work function due to race condition between work queue processing and object lifecycle management.
Root Cause: The inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() function contains a loop that processes work items from a lock-free list. Due to the looping behavior, it's possible for the work function to be queued while the switch_wbs_ctxs list is empty. This creates a race condition where the writeback (wb) object can be freed (when no items hold references to it) while the work is still pending, leading to use-after-free when the work eventually executes.
Attack Surface: This is a local vulnerability affecting the kernel's writeback subsystem. It requires local access and the ability to trigger inode writeback operations, typically through filesystem operations. The vulnerability is triggered through normal filesystem usage patterns involving cgroup operations and inode switching between writebacks.
Fix Mechanism: The patch removes the problematic loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() and processes only one batch of items per work execution. This ensures that when wb_queue_isw() queues work, there's guaranteed to be at least one item in wb->switch_wbs_ctxs, and that item holds a reference to the wb object, preventing premature freeing. The fix also adds a WARN_ON_ONCE check to detect the impossible case of empty list.
03Fix Versions
| Branch | Fixed in | Patch commit |
|---|---|---|
| 6.18 | 6.18.25 | 028103656b84 |
| 7.0 | 7.0.2 | 9223e5f30403 |
| mainline | 7.1-rc1 | 6689f01d6740 |