HIGH
netfilter Catchall Element UAF
CVE-2026-23111
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
KernelScan AI7.8HIGH
01Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate() nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and compared to what is logically required. nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction. It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive elements and processes active ones. Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct: nft_mapelem_activate(): if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask)) return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */ With the buggy catchall version: nft_map_catchall_activate(): if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask)) continue; /* skip inactive, process active */ The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted, nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element. For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero, DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free. This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES. Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate(): skip active elements, process inactive ones.
02KernelScan AI Analysis
Risk summary
An unprivileged local user can exploit this vulnerability to achieve privilege escalation on systems with user namespaces and nftables enabled. By repeatedly aborting nftables transactions, an attacker can cause reference count underflow, leading to premature memory deallocation and use-after-free conditions that can be leveraged for code execution.
Vulnerability analysis
Root Cause: The nft_map_catchall_activate() function has an inverted logic check compared to its non-catchall counterpart. It uses `if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))` which skips inactive elements and processes active ones, when it should do the opposite. This function is called during transaction abort to re-activate catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
Attack Surface: The vulnerability is exploitable locally by unprivileged users through user namespaces combined with nftables operations. When a DELSET operation is aborted, the reference count for chains referenced by NFT_GOTO verdict elements is not properly restored, leading to premature chain deallocation while catchall elements still reference it.
Fix Mechanism: The patch removes the negation operator (!) from the condition check, changing `if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))` to `if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))`. This makes the logic consistent with nft_mapelem_activate() - skip active elements and process inactive ones that need re-activation.
03Fix Versions
| Branch | Fixed in | Patch commit |
|---|---|---|
| 4.20 | 4.20 | 42c574c1504a |
| 5.11 | 5.11 | 8b68a45f9722 |
| 5.15 | 5.15.200 | 8c760ba4e36c |
| 5.5 | 5.5 | 1444ff890b46 |
| 6.1 | 6.1.163 | b9b6573421de |
| 6.12 | 6.12.70 | — |
| 6.18 | 6.18.10 | — |
| 6.4 | 6.4 | f41c5d151078 |
| 6.6 | 6.6.124 | — |
| mainline | 6.19 | — |