KernelScan.io

HIGH

arm64 SVE Signal Context OOB

CVE-2026-23102

CVSS 7.1 / 10.0 NVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

KernelScan AI7.1HIGH

01

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64/fpsimd: signal: Fix restoration of SVE context When SME is supported, Restoring SVE signal context can go wrong in a few ways, including placing the task into an invalid state where the kernel may read from out-of-bounds memory (and may potentially take a fatal fault) and/or may kill the task with a SIGKILL. (1) Restoring a context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM set can place the task into an invalid state where SVCR.SM is set (and sve_state is non-NULL) but TIF_SME is clear, consequently resuting in out-of-bounds memory reads and/or killing the task with SIGKILL. This can only occur in unusual (but legitimate) cases where the SVE signal context has either been modified by userspace or was saved in the context of another task (e.g. as with CRIU), as otherwise the presence of an SVE signal context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM implies that TIF_SME is already set. While in this state, task_fpsimd_load() will NOT configure SMCR_ELx (leaving some arbitrary value configured in hardware) before restoring SVCR and attempting to restore the streaming mode SVE registers from memory via sve_load_state(). As the value of SMCR_ELx.LEN may be larger than the task's streaming SVE vector length, this may read memory outside of the task's allocated sve_state, reading unrelated data and/or triggering a fault. While this can result in secrets being loaded into streaming SVE registers, these values are never exposed. As TIF_SME is clear, fpsimd_bind_task_to_cpu() will configure CPACR_ELx.SMEN to trap EL0 accesses to streaming mode SVE registers, so these cannot be accessed directly at EL0. As fpsimd_save_user_state() verifies the live vector length before saving (S)SVE state to memory, no secret values can be saved back to memory (and hence cannot be observed via ptrace, signals, etc). When the live vector length doesn't match the expected vector length for the task, fpsimd_save_user_state() will send a fatal SIGKILL signal to the task. Hence the task may be killed after executing userspace for some period of time. (2) Restoring a context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM clear does not clear the task's SVCR.SM. If SVCR.SM was set prior to restoring the context, then the task will be left in streaming mode unexpectedly, and some register state will be combined inconsistently, though the task will be left in legitimate state from the kernel's PoV. This can only occur in unusual (but legitimate) cases where ptrace has been used to set SVCR.SM after entry to the sigreturn syscall, as syscall entry clears SVCR.SM. In these cases, the the provided SVE register data will be loaded into the task's sve_state using the non-streaming SVE vector length and the FPSIMD registers will be merged into this using the streaming SVE vector length. Fix (1) by setting TIF_SME when setting SVCR.SM. This also requires ensuring that the task's sme_state has been allocated, but as this could contain live ZA state, it should not be zeroed. Fix (2) by clearing SVCR.SM when restoring a SVE signal context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM clear. For consistency, I've pulled the manipulation of SVCR, TIF_SVE, TIF_SME, and fp_type earlier, immediately after the allocation of sve_state/sme_state, before the restore of the actual register state. This makes it easier to ensure that these are always modified consistently, even if a fault is taken while reading the register data from the signal context. I do not expect any software to depend on the exact state restored when a fault is taken while reading the context.

02

Engine v0.2.0

Risk summary

An attacker with local access can trigger out-of-bounds memory reads in the kernel by manipulating SVE signal contexts on ARM64 systems with SME support. While the vulnerability can cause information disclosure by reading unrelated kernel memory into SVE registers, the leaked data cannot be directly accessed due to hardware access controls. The primary impact is potential system crashes or task termination via SIGKILL when vector length mismatches are detected.

Affectedarch/arm64/kernel/signal.c

Vulnerability analysis

Root Cause: The vulnerability occurs during SVE (Scalable Vector Extension) signal context restoration on ARM64 systems with SME (Scalable Matrix Extension) support. Two specific issues exist: (1) When restoring SVE context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM set, the code can create an inconsistent state where SVCR.SM is set but TIF_SME flag is clear, leading to out-of-bounds memory reads when task_fpsimd_load() uses an arbitrary SMCR_ELx.LEN value that may exceed the allocated sve_state buffer size. (2) When restoring context with SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM clear, the code fails to clear SVCR.SM, leaving the task in an unexpected streaming mode state.

Attack Surface: This vulnerability requires local access with the ability to manipulate signal contexts, either through direct userspace modification of SVE signal contexts or through tools like CRIU that save/restore contexts across tasks. The attack requires ARM64 hardware with SME support and specific signal handling scenarios involving SVE contexts with streaming mode flags.

Fix Mechanism: The patch fixes both issues by: (1) Properly setting TIF_SME flag when SVCR.SM is set and ensuring sme_state allocation before register restoration, (2) Explicitly clearing SVCR.SM when SVE_SIG_FLAG_SM is not set, and (3) Moving all flag and state manipulations (SVCR, TIF_SVE, TIF_SME, fp_type) to occur immediately after memory allocation but before register data restoration to ensure consistent state even if faults occur during register data copying.

03

BranchFixed inPatch commit
6.16.1.1629bc3adba8c35
6.186.18.87b5a52cf252a
6.66.6.123ce820dd4e6e2
mainline6.19d2907cbe9ea0